In today’s daf the gemara mentions in passing that according to one pshat the pasuk of “Shivisi Hashem l’negdi samid” teaches us that when one davens he should visualize that the Shechina is in front of him. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 98) writes an entire siman on the topic of realizing that one is talking to Hashem and how we should approach the mighty concept of tefilla.
First of all when davening, we must concentrate on the explanation of the words that our mouths are saying. Mishna Berura stresses that one must understand the simple meaning, and not delve into the esoteric depths of tefilla, furthermore all the mental preparations that are required, should be done before one starts Shmoneh Esreh for during davening one must solely focus on the simple translation.
One must expel all of his thoughts until his mind is clear, and he should meditate as to what amount of meticulous preparation he would put in when speaking before an earthly king, how much more so when speaking to Hashem. If a thought does enter his mind during davening, he should wait quietly until the thought goes away. The Mishna Berura cites an interesting Shela who states that as a segula not to be interrupted with other thoughts during tefilla, before davening he should say the pasuk “Lev bara li Elokim v’ruach nachon chadash b’kirbi” three times, and each time he recites it he should pass his right hand over his forehead. If thoughts enter during davening he should do as the above, just instead of reciting the pasuk out loud he should think it in his mind.
The Rema adds that before davening one should ponder the greatness of Hashem and conversely the smallness of man.
One must daven as a poor person pleading for mercy, slowly enunciating each word. One must make sure not to daven in a way that it seems that he can’t wait to finish. Mishna Berura points out that one must be exceedingly careful in this regard, since there are poskim which hold that if one davened in such a manner he must daven again. Although we don’t rule in accord with these poskim, it shows the severity of not davening properly.
In today’s daf the gemara teaches us that it is a mitzvah for every person to write a Sefer Torah, even if he inherited one from his parents. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De’ah 270:1) rules in accordance to this gemara.
There are several points that are dealt with in the poskim.
1) Does a woman have this mitzva of writing a Sefer Torah as well? The Rambam clearly rules that a woman is not included in this mitzvah. However the Shaagas Aryeh has difficulty understanding where the Rambam based his ruling from.
2) Can one be yotze his chiyuv through shutfus - by participating with others in a joint writing of one Sefer Torah? The Bais Efraim is in doubt if one can be yotze through shutfus. The Pardes David is astonished at the general custom which allows one to be yotze his chiyuv through shitfus. But he concludes that there is a bit of proof that one may be yotze through shitfus.
3) May one give his Sefer Torah to a Shul? Interestingly, the Toras Chaim (on our daf) is of the opinion that if one does so then he must write another one. He proves his ruling with simple logic. Since when he gave it to the Shul he consecrated it, then it belongs to hekdesh so to speak, and it’s not his any longer. And even though he wrote a Sefer Torah, that does not absolve him from this mitzvah, for it is not dependent on merely writing one. The biggest proof to that is, if he lost his Sefer Torah he would have to write another one. Therefore he concludes that one should only give away a Sefer Torah to a Shul if he has another one with him.
However the B’nei Yona argues that it is dependent on writing alone, and if it got lost he is still yotze his chiyuv. Furthermore even if it chas v’shalom got burned and it’s entirely gone he is most probably yotze his chiyuv.
Nevertheless, he concurs that one should not be makdish his Sefer Torah to the Shul, rather it should still remain his. The Pardes David and the Toras Nesanel also argue on the Toras Chaim and maintain that even if it got lost one is yotze his chiyuv.
In today’s daf the gemara records a machlokes between the Chachamim and Rabbi Yehuda regarding where the women stand when attending a funeral. Chachamim are of the opinion that they may stand both in front and behind the coffin, while Rabbi Yehuda maintains that they may only stand in front. Tosfos explains that since when attending a funeral it is a time of anguish, we are not concerned that the men will see the women and have illicit thoughts, therefore we allow the women to stand in front of the coffin while the men are behind them. However Tosfos continues that there are those who have the custom to position the men in front of the coffin and the women behind it, for it is improper for the men to gaze at the women.
There are many things men are forbidden to do, so as to distance themselves from immorality. Obviously these laws do not apply to one’s wife. Due to the severity of these laws and the fact that it is unknown to many people, this article will be a bit explicit.
It is forbidden to:
1) Wink, snap the fingers or any other bodily movement that is considered flirting.
2)Joke around with a woman, or to act in a light hearted manner.
3) Gaze at her beauty. This also applies to an unmarried girl.
4) Smell the perfume that a woman is wearing.
5) Gaze at the clothing of a woman that one knows, even if she is not wearing it at the time.
6) If one is walking down the street and a woman is walking in front of him, it is forbidden to continue to walk behind her, rather he should quicken his pace and go in front of her. If this is not possible, then he should either go to the side or wait until she is sufficiently ahead of him. There is a machlokes of how much of a distance needs to be between them. Mahari and others hold that it is enough if a man is four amos behind a woman, while the Radvaz rules that one must distance himself until he can’t clearly see her walking and movements. This applies even where ladies go covered from head to toe.
In today’s daf the gemara says that one of Rabbi Yosi enactments in Tzipori was that women should speak to each other in the restroom, so as to caution the men not to enter the room and transgress yichud. Rashi explains that their restrooms were in the fields, so if a man would enter while the women are there, he would have been oiver on yichud.
The Rema (Even Ha’ezer 22:13) cites Rambam who rules that these days there is no need for this takana, because our restrooms are in the city.
Min Hatorah, one may not be secluded in a room with any of the “ervos” (i.e. any woman that is forbidden for him to marry), except for a mother and her son,a father and his daughter, and a husband with his wife who is a niddah (ibid 22:1). Even one’s sister one is not permitted to live with, rather only a yichud arai - a temporary passing seclusion, is permitted (Chelkas Michokek).
The Chachamim additionally forbade for a man to be secluded with a girl (Even Ha’ezer 22:2).
There are many halachos in the laws of yichud, as well as many exceptions. To name a few:
1) Ishto Imo - If one’s wife is with him while he is secluded with another woman, then yichud does not apply (ibid 22:3)
2) Ba’ala B’ir -There isn’t any problem of yichud when the woman’s husband is in town, the rationale being that the woman won’t do anything immoral for she is afraid that her husband will walk in (ibid 22:8). There is a disagreement between Rashi and Tosfos whether this is permissible lichatchila. If the husband is in the same city but he most definitely will not walk into the room while his wife is secluded with another man, for example he is in prison, or even if he works in a different part of the city and it is long distance commute, then there is an issur of yichud (Igros Moshe Even Ha’ezer 4:65:7)
3) Pasuach Lirshus Harabim - When the room in question has an opening to a public place then one may be secluded with a woman (ibid 22:9). The time of day would make no difference, as long as there are people passing by (Be’er Heitiv). An opening means that people can see into the room, therefore if there is a window that is higher than the eye level of the people passing by on the street then yichud would apply (Igros Moshe Even Ha’ezer 4:65:2).
In today’s daf the gemara asked how can the mishna state that a Kohein Gadol says eidus. We know that even though there is a lav (Torah prohibition) to ignore a lost item, rather one must pick it up and return it to its owner, and yet the Torah teaches us that there are exceptions; a kohein in a cemetery, an elder which is not befitting him to return this lost item, or if the lost item is worth less than the amount ofmoney he can make in the time it takes to return it. Similarly asks the gemara there should be an exemption for the Kohen Gadol to give testimony, since it is beneath his dignity to come testify regarding a common person.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 263:1) clarifies that even a young talmid chacham, or a well respected person (Aruch Hashulchan), is exempt from returning a lost item which is below their dignity to deal with, for example a bale of hay.
Although they are usually exempt from returning a lost item that is beneath their dignity to deal with, they will be required to do so if they actually moved or picked up the item, since they started the mitzvah (ibid 263:2). The Shach directs us to a halacha in 261:2 where the Mechaber rules that if one found an animal grazing in someone else’s vineyard or field then he is obligated to return it, because the animal is damaging that property. This is termed aveidas karka (in other words, the owner of the vineyard is being caused a loss, so the person seeing the animal grazing has an obligation to return it to his owner, so as not to cause a loss to the owner of the field). At first glance it is difficult to see the apparent connection. Rabbi Akiva Eiger explains that the Shach is proving that since the Mechaber does not state that he should just simply move the animal to a ownerless field, that shows that once he moved the animal he is obligated to return to its owner. However the Or Zerua cites Ritva that disagrees, and maintains that it is enough if he merely moves it to an ownerless field.
The Mechaber (ibid 263:3) rules that if the these people want to go beyond the call of duty and lower themselves to return the lost item, they may do so. The Rema disagrees, and quotes Rosh that the most such people are allowed to do, is to pay the owner for the lost item.
After Beis Din listens to all the claims from the litigants, and any testimony from witnesses, they send everyone out of the room and precede to deliberate the case. If they all agree as what the halacha should be, well and good, but if they don’t then they follow the majority opinion (Choshen Mishpat 18:1).
In instances where either; a) one dayan says chayav and another says zakkai, while the third abstains from stating an opinion because he doesn’t know, or b) even if both dayanim agree what the ruling should be, but the third does not know what to rule, then two more dayanim are added. Now that there are five dayanim they deliberate once again, and if there is a majority opinion either way, then that is what the ruling would be. If however the same scenario repeats itself that there is an equally divided opinion and the fifth does not know, then an additional two are added (ibid).
It is interesting to note that if there would be a similar case as example b above, where three dayanim rule one way while the fourth disagrees and the fifth abstains, or if four dayanim rule one way and the fifth abstains, then we follow the majority opinion. Even though earlier such an instance would cause us to add more dayanim, here is different. The difference is because in order to follow the majority opinion of a Beis Din there obviously needs to be a Beis Din in the first place, and that can only happen when there are at least three opinions. Therefore in the case of three alone then more dayanim need to be added in order to follow the majority, while in the instance where more were already added, then there are already three that gave an opinion, so we may follow the majority (S’ma ibid).
In today’s daf the gemara informs us of David Hamelech’s custom of waking at midnight and learning until dawn. Today this is known as Tikun Chatzos, for that time of night is a particularly auspicious time for learning and prayer, especially to lament the destruction of the Bais Hamikdash and to pray for its speedy rebuilding.
There is a dispute among the poskim as to when exactly Chatzos is. Without going into a lengthy explanation of the various opinions, suffice to say that the Mor Uktzia, Shulchan Aruch Harav and the Mishna Berura all agree that Chatzos is alwaysexactly at midnight, meaning the halfway point between Tzeis and Alos.
Although we see from this gemara that David Hamelech learned after Chatzos, and this would imply that we should do so as well in regard to Tikun Chatzos, there are Achronim that hold otherwise. While the Mishna Berura, Kaf Hachaim and others advocate that one should learn from Chatzos and on, the Arugas Habosem held that one may learn the first half of the night rather than the second. Similarly the Chasam Sofer writes that most people that learn at night, do so the first half of the night. The Seder Hayom explains why one should rather learn the first half of the night, for the simple reason he might find it hard to get up in middle of the night to learn, and the night would pass without him learning.
Tikun Chatzos is a great mitzva, but it cannot come of the expense of falling asleep during davening (Elya Rabbah). Similarly a person who is by nature made of a weaker composition and needs his sleep, he need not arise for Tikun Chatzos.
In today’s daf the gemara explains that the difference between the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Akiva (which at first glance both Tannaim seem to be saying the same thing; a wolf, lion etc. that killed a person must be killed by a Beis Din of twenty three), is if a snake killed a person. According to Rabbi Akiva it is not in the same category as the wolf, lion etc. while the Tanna Kamma is of the opinion that it is. Rashi explains Rabbi Akiva with a mishna in Bava Kamma (15b), where there is a machlokes between the Tanna Kamma andRabbi Eliezer whether a wolf, lion etc. automatically has a status of a muad (an animal which is established to damage) or not, but they both agree that a snake is always considered a muad.
The Shulchan Aruch (Choshen Mishpat 389) explains the concept, possible scenarios, and their various halachik outcomes.
Any creature which is owned by a person that damages, the owner is liable to pay. This does not apply to an Eved (Tur). Not all damages are paid in full, rather only damages that can occur when the creature does an action that comes naturally to it. For example an animal that caused damage by eating someone else’s hay, or if it stepped on items while walking, these types of cases would require the owner to pay in full, since the owner should have thought of that natural scenario and stopped his animal from damaging. In instances where the animal damaged in an unnatural way, for example a cow that bit someone, then he only pays half of the damages.
Therefore if an animal damages three times in the same unnatural manner, then we say that this particular thing (for example biting) became natural to this animal, so the owner would have to pay for the damages in full. This is the logic behind tam and muad.
However there are six creatures (wolf, lion etc. and snake) which the Chachamim determined are naturally inclined to cause damage, even if they are domesticated, so it will make no difference as to what specific action caused the damage, for any action he does will have the status of a muad, therefore the owner is liable to pay in full. However the Rema disagrees and is of the opinion that only a snake has an automatic status as a creature that will damage through any action, but the other five are only a muad for specific actions that are natural to them, for example a lion to be doires and a wolfto be toref, but not vice versa.
In today’s daf the gemara mentions that when they gave semicha to Rav Zeira they lauded his greatness, and they expressed themselves with the same words that was used in the time of the gemara to praise a kallah, “without kichul, without serak, without pirkus and yet she is still full of chein”, meaning that without adding any embellishments to Rav Zeira, he was still a great scholar. Rashi defines; kichul - makeup for the eyes, serak - makeup for the face, pirkus - braiding the hair. Tosfos points out that Rashi in Kesubos (4b) learned that pirkus is really serak.
Understanding the exact meaning is not just academic, for there are halachik differences.
1) The above mentioned gemara in Kesubos discusses that a woman when either she or her husband is an aveil may not do kichul and pirkus. For a married woman this only applies during shivah, but after that she may do so in order that she should not be misganeh al baalah (Yoreh De’ah 381:6).
2) A kallah that became an aveil may do kichul and pirkus for up to thirty days after her wedding, even during shivah (ibid).
3) A girl that has reached marriageable age and she became an aveil, she may too do kichul and pirkus (ibid).
In today’s daf the gemara continues to discuss the laws of making a leap year. The gemara records a machlokes between Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosi. Rashi explains the opinion of Rabbi Yosi and an important part of the calculation, is lo adu rosh, meaning that the first day of Rosh Hashana cannot fall out on a Sunday, Wednesday or Friday.
In the times of the Bais Hamikdash they established a months length based on testimony from witnesses that saw the new moon. But that all changed when Hillel made a calendar whose specific rules would allow the smooth running of the Jewish year. Each year has a set amount of months whose length is either a 29 or 30 day month.
Every couple of years there is a need to add an additional month in order to enable the the holidays to fall in the same season each year (the seasons follow the solar year, and the Jewish calendar follows the lunar year). There is a set timeline as to which year will be a leap year.
According to the calendar’s calculation there are specific days which will never fall out on a given Yom Tov.
Rosh Hashana - Sunday, Wednesday and Friday.
Yom Kippur - Sunday, Tuesday and Friday.
Hoshana Rabba - Tuesday, Thursday and Shabbos.
Chanuka - Tuesday. Incidentally, this is the reason for the custom to distribute “Chanuka Gelt” on the 5th day of Chanuka, since it can never fall out on a Shabbos (Steipler).
Ta’anis Esther - Sunday, Tuesday and Friday.
Purim - Monday, Wednesday and Shabbos.
Pesach - Monday, Wednesday and Friday.
Shvuos - Tuesday, Thursday and Shabbos.
Shiva Asar B’tamuz - Monday, Wednesday and Friday.
Tisha B’av - Monday, Wednesday and Friday.
Another calculation that manifests itself through the calendar, is the correlation between two important days. Meaning the day of the week in which A falls out will always be the same day as B (i.e. the upcoming B).
Gaze at any part of a woman’s body. 